



# Kunngerðablaðið A

2025

Givið út 30. desember 2025

Nr. 226

30. desember 2025

## Kunngerð um broyting í kunngerð um avmarkandi tiltøk

(Avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við destabiliserandi virksemi, tiltøk móti ávísimum skipum, o.a.)

### § 1

Í kunngerð nr. 108 frá 18. november 2024 um avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við atgerðir móti Ukraina, sum broytt við kunngerð nr. 37 frá 24. mars 2025, verða gjørdar hesar broytingar:

- Heitið á kunngerðini verður orðað soleiðis:

“**Kunngerð um ávís avmarkandi tiltøk**”

- Inngangurin til kunngerðina verður orðaður soleiðis:

“Við heimild í § 3, stk. 1 og 3, § 4, stk. 1 og 4, § 5, § 5 a, § 6, stk. 2, § 9 og § 10, stk. 2 í løgtingslóg nr. 90 frá 17. mai 2022 um ávís avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við atgerðir móti Ukraina, sum broytt við løgtingslóg nr. 193 frá 4. desember 2025, verða gjørdar hesar broytingar:”

- Í § 7, stk. 2, § 9, stk. 5 og § 20, stk. 1 verður “Landsstýrismaðurin” broytt til: “Landsstýrisfólkið” og í § 13, stk. 4 verður “landsstýrismaðurin” broytt til: “landsstýrisfólkið”

- Aftan á § 3, men áðrenn yvirskriftina yvir § 4, verður sett:

“**3 a.** Allir ognarlutir, sum eru ogn, í varðveitslu ella undir ræði hjá likamligum ella lögfrøðiligum persónum ella eindum, nevndir í skjali 1 A ella 1 B, skulu frystast.

*Stk. 2.* Eingin ognarlutur skal vera til fyrimuns fyri ella latast likamligum ella lögfrøðiligum persónum ella eindum, nevndir í skjali 1 A ella 1 B, at ráða yvir, hvørki beinleiðis ella óbeinleiðis.

*Stk. 3.* Stk. 1 og 2 eru ikki galdandi fyri fiskiskap í altjóða sjógvi, sum er heimilaður í fiskiveiðuavtaluni millum Føroyar og Russland. Undantakið er ikki galdandi fyri føroyskar likamligar ella lögfrøðiligar persónar ella eindir.”

- Aftan á § 13, men áðrenn yvirskriftina yvir § 14, verður sett:

“*Forboð fyri útflutningi o.a. av marglætisvørur*”

§ 13 a. Tað er bannað beinleiðis ella óbeinleiðis at selja, veita, flyta ella útflyta marglætisvørur, nevndar í skjali 2 A, sama um vørurnar hava uppruna í Føroyum ella aðrastaðni, umframt eisini einhvørjar tænastrur, ið eru knýttar at vørur nevndar í skjali 2 A til likamligar ella lögfrøðiligar persónar ella eindir í Russlandi, til nýtslu í Russlandi ella setan umborð á skipi undir russiskum flaggi. Forboðið í 1. pkt. er galdandi fyri marglætisvørur, nevndar í skjali 2 A, um virðið er omanfyri 300 evrur fyri hvørja vøru, um ikki annað er ásett í skjalinum.

*Stk. 2.* Tað er bannað:

- Beinleiðis ella óbeinleiðis at veita tøkniligan stuðul, meklarætænastrur, viðlíkahald ella aðrar tænastrur til likamligar ella lögfrøðiligar persónar ella eindir í Russlandi, ella til nýtslu í Russlandi, knýttar til aðrar vørur enn tær vørur, sum sambært stk. 1 eru loyvdar at útflyta til Russlands.
- Beinleiðis ella óbeinleiðis at veita figging ella figgjartiligan stuðul, knýtt at sølu, veiting, flyting ella útflutning av øðrum vørur enn tær, sum nevndar eru sambært stk. 1, ella í sambandi við veiting av atknýttum tøkniligum stuðli, meklarætænastrur, viðlíkahald, ella øðrum tænastrur, til likamligar ella lögfrøðiligar persónar ella eindir í Russlandi ella til nýtslu í Russlandi.

*Stk. 3.* Forboðið í stk. 1 og 2 er ikki galdandi fyri vørur undir CN 7113 00 og CN 7114 00 00, sum eru persónlig ogn hjá likamligum persónum, sum ferðast úr Føroyum, og sum ikki eru ætlaðar til sølu.”

- Skjal 1 í kunngerð nr. 108 frá 18. november 2024 um avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við

- atgerðir móti Ukraina, verður orðað sum ásett í skjali 1.
7. Skjal 2 verður sett sum skjal 1 A í kunngerð nr. 108 frá 18. november 2024 um avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við atgerðir móti Ukraina.
8. Skjal 3 verður sett sum skjal 1 B í kunngerð nr. 108 frá 18. november 2024 um avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við atgerðir móti Ukraina.
9. Skjal 2 í kunngerð nr. 108 frá 18. november 2024 um avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við atgerðir móti Ukraina, verður orðað sum ásett í skjali 4.
10. Skjal 5 verður sett sum skjal 2 A í kunngerð nr. 108 frá 18. november 2024 um avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við atgerðir móti Ukraina. (luksusvørur)
11. Skjal 6 A í kunngerð nr. 108 frá 18. november 2024 um avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við atgerðir móti Ukraina, verður orðað sum ásett í skjali 6. (skipalistin)
12. Skjal 15 í kunngerð nr. 108 frá 18. november 2024 um avmarkandi tiltøk í sambandi við atgerðir móti Ukraina, verður orðað sum ásett í skjali 7.

## § 2

Henda kunngerð kemur í gildi 1. januar 2026.

Uttanríkis- og mentamálaráðið, 30. desember 2025

**Sirið Stenberg (sign.)**  
landsstýriskvinna

/ Herálvur Joensen (sign.)

Skjal 1

“Skjal 1

**Listi við líkamligum og lögfrøðiligum persónum, samsvarandi fylgiskjali I til fyriskipan Ráðsins nr. 269/2014**

Samanskriðu listin hjá Evropasamveldinum við líkamligum og lögfrøðiligum persónum, sum eru fevnd av avmarkandi tiltøkunum sambært § 3, samsvarandi fylgiskjali I til fyriskipan Ráðsins nr. 269/2014, sæst á heimasíðuni hjá Uttanríkis- og mentamálaráðnum, [www.ummr.fo](http://www.ummr.fo)”

**Listi við líkamligum og lögfrøðiligum persónum, samsvarandi fylgiskjali I til fyriskipan Ráðsins nr. 2024/2642**

## A. Líkamligir persónar

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Identifying information</b>	<b>Statement of Reasons</b>	<b>Date of listing</b>
1.	Artem Sergeevich KUREEV (Russian: Артём Сергеевич КУРЕЕВ)	Officer of the 5th Service of the Federal Security Service, Editor-in-chief of the ‘African Initiative’, Founder of ‘Rusafro’  DOB: 24.10.1980  POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: male  Passport number: 4002209800  Tax Identification Number (INN): 782500167259	Artem Sergeevich Kureev is a Russian Federal Security Service officer involved in malign activities, namely coordinated disinformation campaigns, both in Europe and Africa. He conducts influence campaigns in Europe, including by organising the dissemination of articles in Russian and their English translations on proxy websites and making payments for the publication of pro-Russian articles, with the aim of spreading Russian disinformation in Europe. He founded two media outlets in Africa and conducted deliberate disinformation campaigns aiming at undermining Western health projects in Africa by spreading conspiracy theories such as the alleged use of Africa for biological warfare experiments and illicit trials of various drugs by Western pharmaceutical companies.  Therefore, Artem Sergeevich Kureev is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
2.	Nikolai Aleksandrovich TUPIKIN (russisk: Николай Александрович ТУПИКИН)	Executive director of the Structura National Technologies a.k.a. GK Struktura  POB: USSR (now Russian Federation)  Nationality: Russian  Gender: male	Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is the head and founder of Structura National Technologies (GK Struktura). The company has been involved in the so-called ‘Doppelganger’ campaign, a Russian-led digital disinformation campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union’s Member States, the United States and Ukraine. He works in close	16.12.2024

		<p>Tax Identification Number (INN): 773402066160</p>	<p>coordination with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. He has also been one of the key figures in Russia's disinformation campaign across Latin America aiming at undermining support for Ukraine.</p> <p>Therefore, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. He is also associated with Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova, department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure.</p>	
3.	<p>Sofia Avraamovna ZAKHAROVA (Russian: Софья Авраамовна ЗАХАРОВА)</p>	<p>Department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: female</p>	<p>Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is the department head in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. She has been involved in the so-called 'Doppelganger' campaign aimed at manipulating information and spreading disinformation in support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and targeting the Union's Member States, the United States and Ukraine. She has been working directly with Ilya Gambashidze and Nikolai Tupikin, heads of Social Design Agency and GK Struktura, respectively, on this operation. She has also been one of the team leaders and active members of the so-called 'Team I' lead by Ilya Gambashidze, which stands behind the Kremlin's campaign for disinformation in the West, interfering in the elections of different countries, and is preparing projects to discredit the Russian opposition.</p> <p>Therefore, Sofia Avraamovna Zakharova is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third</p>	16.12.2024

			countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
4.	Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV (Russian: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ)	Commander of GRU unit 29155 Major General DOB: 29.9.1967 POB: USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax Identification Number (INN): 773378888007	Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is a high-ranking military official of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). After the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the restructuring of the Wagner Group, the command of Russian military operations in Africa was restructured and placed under the Africa Corps under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and Averyanov was placed in charge of the operations. In many African countries, Russian forces provide security to military juntas that have overthrown legitimate democratic governments, gravely worsening the stability, security and democracy of the countries. In addition, Russian forces in Africa exploit the natural resources there to finance their operations. In the beginning of 2024, Russian forces took control of the Intahaka gold mine in Mali. Therefore, Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov is implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in third countries by undermining the democratic political process in the African countries where Russian forces operate and by exploiting an armed conflict, instability or insecurity, including through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and wildlife in a third country.	16.12.2024
5.	Tinatin Givievna KANDELAKI a.k.a. Tina KANDELAKI (Russian: Тинатин Гивиевна КАНДЕЛАКИ)	Journalist, public figure, celebrity, TV presenter and producer, Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding DOB: 10.11.1975 POB: Tbilisi, Georgian SSR (now Georgia) Nationality: Georgian Gender: female	Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is a Russian journalist employed by the state-owned company Gazprom Media, and a public figure who has been using her popularity and influence in the public sphere to voice Russian propaganda and to justify the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. She was among those who performed during the Luzhniki stadium concert of 18 March 2022 that marked the 8th anniversary of the illegal annexation of Crimea and	16.12.2024

			<p>served as a symbol of support for the ongoing war in Ukraine. After 2014, she fully supported the illegal annexation of Crimea. Moreover, she is a Deputy General Director of Gazprom Media Holding, a holding of several media outlets that spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and justify Russian aggression against Ukraine.</p> <p>Several TV channels owned and governed by Gazprom Media Holding have replaced Ukrainian TV outlets on local TV frequencies previously seized forcefully by Russians after the Russian invasion of Crimea and have thus actively participated in the process of the illegal annexation of Crimea. Therefore, Tinatin Givievna Kandelaki is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States, in an international organisation, or in a third country, or which undermine or threaten the sovereignty or independence of one or several of its Member States, or of a third country, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	
6.	Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO (Russian: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО)	Former assistant of Member of Bundestag Eugen Schmidt DOB: 23.5.1971 POB: Lviv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian / Ukrainian Gender: male	Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko is a former parliamentary assistant of the Member of the German Bundestag, Eugen Schmidt. In parallel, Sergiyenko actively colluded with Russian intelligence officers seeking to leverage his privileged parliamentary and political access to the detriment of the democratic political process and constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Germany. Therefore, Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko implemented and supported actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and security in the Federal Republic of Germany by engaging in,	16.12.2024

			directly or indirectly, the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process.	
7.	Denis Alexandrovich SMOLYANINOV (Russian: Денис Александрович СМОЛЯНИНОВ)	GRU colonel DOB: 26.8.1976 POB: Chelyabinsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 672904784466	Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is a GRU colonel who specialises in psychological operations. He is in charge of the Ukrainian direction of the GRU. Lists of mercenaries to be sent to the Donbass passed through the Ukrainian direction. He also supervised two private military companies (PMCs) associated with the Ministry of Defense: Longifolia, a military company of crime bosses from the 1990s, through which contacts were established with Western PMCs, and Convoy, the military security company. Shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he deployed an agent network in Ukraine. He uses Telegram channels to spread disinformation, including in Ukraine. Through social media he recruits agents for sabotage activities in the Union and other activities aimed at creating tensions between NATO countries. The GRU is responsible for actively preparing explosions, arson and damage to infrastructure on Union territory, with the goal of slowing down the supply of weapons to Ukraine and of creating discord and the appearance of dissatisfaction with support for Ukraine in Europe. Therefore, Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing acts of violence, and by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
8.	Vladimir/ Volodymyr LIPCHENKO (Russian: Володимир ЛИПЧЕНКО)	GRU officer DOB: 28.9.1974 POB: Mykolaiv, Ukrainian SSR (now Ukraine) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 4015400649	Vladimir Lipchenko is a GRU officer responsible for hybrid attacks in Europe under his pseudonym 'Wlodek Lyakh'. He is part of a special department led by GRU Colonel Denis Alexandrovich Smolyaninov, set up to conduct sabotage activities in Western countries. He recruited a person to set fire to the Museum of the	16.12.2024

			Occupation in Riga by throwing Molotov cocktails. Therefore, Vladimir Lipchenko is responsible for or implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	
9.	Yuriy SIZOV (Russian: Юрий СИЗОВ)	GRU military officer DOB: 17.2.1988 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport number: 784805190577	Yuriy Sizov is a GRU military officer. He serves in military unit No 92154. He personally gave instructions to recruit agents to target a hypermarket in Kyiv and recorded a video tutorial on installing an explosive device in one of the stores of the same chain in the Moscow region. He was also responsible for orchestrating sabotage in Ukraine in the Lviv region in February 2024. He supervised and gave orders to the Russian intelligence agents involved in the planned sabotage activity. Therefore, Yuriy Sizov is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union by planning and directing acts of violence.	16.12.2024
10.	Visa Nokhayevich MIZAEV (Виса Нохаевич МИЗАЕВ) a.k.a. Vishan Nochaevic MIZAYEV; Vysa Nokhaevich MIZAEV; Visa Nokhaievych MIZAIEV; Oleg SHISHKIN	Entrepreneur DOB: 9.7.1963 POB: Grozny, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male Passport No 753870064 (Russian Federation) Passport No PRE0018440 (Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481101523410	Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev is a Russian entrepreneur. He played a key role in a Russian intelligence operation against the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in which he instigated his accomplices to procure highly classified information from the BND and to pass it to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB). Therefore, Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Federal Republic of Germany by attempting to destabilise the constitutional order.	16.12.2024
11.	Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA (Ольга Алексеевна БЕЛЯВЦЕВА) a.k.a.	Entrepreneur DOB: 25.10.1969 POB: Lipetsk, USSR (now Russian Federation)	Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva is a Russian entrepreneur. She is the wife and business partner of Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev. She is associated with Visa Nokhayevich	16.12.2024

	Olha Oleksiyivna BIELIAVTSEVA; Olga Alekseevna BELJIAWZEWA; Olga Aleksevna MIZAEV	Nationality: Russian Gender: female Passport No 768613166 (Russian Federation) Tax Identification Number (INN): 481100083621	Mizaev through the co-ownership of the two Russia-based Limited Liability Companies ‘OOO Agronom-sad’ and ‘OOO Biplast’. She founded those companies and was the single shareholder before transferring 30 % of the shares for each company after their marriage in 2018. Moreover, Belyavtseva and Mizaev had a similar ownership arrangement over the company Agronom-Sad Trading before Mizaev sold his shares to Belyavtseva on 22 February 2023 in direct temporal connection with Visa Mizaev’s involvement in the Russian intelligence operation against the Federal Republic of Germany, providing Mizaev with additional liquidity and concealing his asset base. Therefore, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva supports natural or legal persons, entities or bodies engaged in implementing actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. She is also associated with Visa Nokhayevich Mizaev.	
12.	Timofey Vyacheslavovich BORDACHEV (Russian: Тимофей Вячеславович БОРДАЧЕВ)	Political scientist DOB: 28.1.1973 POB: St. Petersburg, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is a Russian political scientist and international affairs specialist. He is the Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Academic Supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, as well as member of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy. Through his activities, he substantially contributes to the ideological base and rationalisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and aggressive policies of the Kremlin, including by promoting the view that neither Ukraine as a state nor its government are legitimate. Therefore, Timofey Vyacheslavovich Bordachev is responsible for or supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or	16.12.2024

			threaten the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine by engaging in and supporting the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
13.	Harouna DOUAMBA	Businessman, director of the Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'investissement DOB: 8.1.1973 POB: Cocody, Ivory Coast Nationality: Ivorian Gender: male	Harouna Douamba is an Ivorian businessman, and the head of a pro-Russian, anti-Western disinformation network in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burkina Faso. In 2011, Douamba founded a non-governmental organisation called <i>Aimons Notre Afrique</i> (ANACOM) in the CAR. That organisation received funding from Lobaye Invest, which has been associated with the Wagner Group. In 2022, Harouna Douamba established the <i>Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement</i> (GPCI) in Burkina Faso. GPCI has been involved in covert influence operations. Harouna Douamba's disinformation networks were dismantled by Meta in May 2021, and later in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI-related disinformation groups are still active and running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns, with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. Therefore, Harouna Douamba is supporting and implementing actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
14.	Anatolii PRIZENKO	Businessman DOB: 26.11.1974 POB: Moldovan SSR (now Republic of Moldova) Nationality: Moldovan	Anatolii Prizenko is a businessman in the Republic of Moldova. In late October 2023, he coordinated the dispatch of several citizens of the Republic of Moldova to France, where they painted the Star of	16.12.2024

		Gender: male	<p>David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media and had a significant destabilising effect in the context of the conflict between Israel and Hamas following the attacks on 7 October 2023. Images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Government of the Russian Federation and used by Russian actors to conduct disinformation campaigns.</p> <p>Anatolii Prizenko publicly took responsibility for his role as the organiser of that operation. According to media reports, that destabilising operation was carried out for the benefit of the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, and aimed at fuelling tensions in French society. Therefore, Anatolii Prizenko is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a Member State and, therefore, in the Union by planning, directing, or engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	
15.	<p>Alesia MILORADOVICH or Alesya MILORADOVICH or Olesya MILORADOVIC Алеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ or Олеся МИЛОРАДОВИЧ</p>	<p>Russian Government employee, 'Foreign Affairs Facilitator' Associate of the project 'Foreign journalists for Russia' ('Иностранцы за Россию') DOB: 10.3.1968 POB: Angarsk, USSR (now Russian Federation) Nationality: Russian Gender: female</p>	<p>Alesya Miloradovich is a collaborator of the Government of the Russian Federation in France, and calls herself a 'foreign affairs facilitator'.</p> <p>Alesya Miloradovich organised a so-called 'electoral observation' mission in the Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia, in the context of the referendum on the annexation of those regions to Russia, and recruited French nationals who participated in the mission. She publicly admitted that she did this for the benefit of the Russian Government.</p> <p>She was also a co-organiser of trips for French children to the Artek International Children Center in illegally annexed Crimea, which were funded by the Government of the Russian Federation. She has also been involved in the Russian</p>	16.12.2024

			<p>propaganda project ‘Foreign journalists for Russia’ and has participated in spreading pro-Russian views, including by claiming that French and Western societies support Russian actions against Ukraine.</p> <p>Therefore, Alesya Miloradovich is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, or otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process of a third country, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.</p>	
16.	Oleg Sergeevich EREMENKO (Russian: Олег Сергеевич ЕРЕМЕНКО)	<p>Representative of Officers of Russia, former GRU officer          DOB: 18.5.1978          POB: Bischkek, Kyrgyz SSR (now Kyrgyzstan)          Nationality: Russian          Gender: Male</p>	<p>Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is a former GRU officer and an active member of various Russian influence groups. Notably, he is a member of ‘Officers of Russia’ an organisation used by the Russian military and security services to influence domestic politics by cultivating links to veterans amongst the Russian diaspora and to retired military and security personnel of former Soviet-allied armed forces, in which he serves as their main representative in Germany. In that capacity, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is associated with the EU designated entities Rossotrudnitschestvo, which is the operator of the ‘Russian House’ in Berlin, and the Wagner Group. In his role as an envoy of the Russian state security apparatus, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is cultivating links to and supporting anti-democratic organisations within Germany. He is well connected with far-left anti-democratic groups and groups of former personnel of outlawed GDR security services and veterans of GDR military formations, such as Desant e.V., a pro-Russian association of former paratroopers.</p> <p>Therefore, Oleg Sergeevich Eremenko is supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which</p>	16.12.2024

			undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Federal Republic of Germany by undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise its constitutional order.	
17.	Alik Yuryevich KHUCHBAROV Alik Yuryevich HUCHBAROV Alik HUTŠBAROV (Russian: Алик Юрьевич ХУЧБАРОВ)	Function: GRU operative DOB: 12.11.1992 Nationality: Russian, Estonian Gender: male Tax identification number: 601515903509	Alik Khuchbarov was responsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia's military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targeted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies. As a collaborator in the GRU's network, Alik Khuchbarov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.	20.5.2025
18.	Ilya Sergeevich BOCHAROV Иља БОТŠАРОВ (Russian: Илья Сергеевич БОЧАРОВ)	Function: GRU operative DOB: 29.6.1991 Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax identification number: 561410364291	Ilya Bocharov was responsible for planning and preparing an operation in Estonia, which entailed damaging the property of public figures who have spoken out against the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as defacing monuments related to World War II. In doing so, he acted	20.5.2025

			<p>under the direction, in the interests and at the request of Russia's military foreign intelligence agency (GRU) to hire perpetrators to carry out the attacks. In the attacks, vehicles of the Estonian Minister of the Interior as well as of the editor-in-chief of a Russian-language newspaper were targeted. The security services of Estonia prevented further attacks targeting more public figures. In addition, several war memorials in Estonia were defaced, with paint thrown on them and swastikas drawn on them. The aim of the operation was to create fear, panic and tension in Estonian society, and to intimidate persons critical of Russian actions and policies. As a collaborator in the GRU's network, Ilya Bocharov is responsible for implementing actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in a Member State through planning and directing acts of violence, including activities to silence, intimidate, coerce, or exact reprisals against persons critical of the actions or policies of the Russian Federation.</p>	
19.	<p>Elena KOLBASNIKOVA (Russian: Елена КОЛБАСНИКОВА)</p>	<p>Nationality: Ukrainian, Russian DOB: 20.3.1975 POB: Dnipro, Ukraine SSR (now Ukraine) Gender: female</p>	<p>Elena Kolbasnikova is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Kolbasnikova formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia's destabilisation of Ukraine. She was sentenced for hate speech in a court of final instance in Germany in regard to her undermining of Ukrainian sovereignty and denouncement of German public institutions. Criminal investigations are ongoing in regard to her support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware, through fundraisers and the provision of aid to separatist groups. Moreover, Kolbasnikova promoted violent acts committed by her husband, Rostislav Teslyuk, against counter-demonstrators, and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian minors seeking refuge in Germany.</p>	20.5.2025

			<p>She thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. She also supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine), through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by supporting separatist movements in Ukraine.</p> <p>Elena Kolbasnikova is associated with Rostislav Teslyuk, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.</p>	
20.	Hüseyin DOGRU	<p>Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye  Nationality: Turkish  Gender: male</p>	<p>Hüseyin Doğru is the founder and representative of AFA Medya A.Ş. which is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.</p> <p>RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.</p> <p>During a violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, RED personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through their online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform, facilitating the violent nature of the protest.</p>	20.5.2025

			Through AFA Medya, Hüseyin Dođru thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in coordinated information manipulation.	
21.	Yulia Sergeevna PROKHOROVA (Russian: Юлия Сергеевна ПРОХОРОВА)	Nationality: Russian DOB: 18.2.1992 Address: Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates. Formerly Landshut, Bavaria, Germany Gender: female	Yulia Prokhorova is a Russian citizen. She resided in Germany until 2024. Yulia Prokhorova sustains a social media campaign in which she promoted the intentional wasting of energy in Germany, seeking to support Russia’s war of aggression. In parallel, she disseminates misinformation in Russian state media about the energy supply, the rule of law, and Ukrainian refugees in Germany. In addition, Yulia Prokhorova intimidated Ukrainian refugees in Europe through public assaults and other forms of harassment, which she recorded and disseminated online. Yulia Prokhorova thus supports actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one Member State by engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and indirectly supporting actions targeted at economic activities and services of public interest.	20.5.2025
22.	Rostislav TESLYUK (Russian: Ростислав ТЕСЛЮК) Alias Max SCHLUND (Russian: Макс ШЛУНД)	Nationality: Russian DOB: 23.4.1982 POB: Moscow Gender: male	Rostislav Teslyuk is a Russian national who has close ties with, and is financially supported by, Rossotrudnitschestwo, a Russian state entity. Rostislav Teslyuk formed political structures with the German anti-democratic extreme political right in support of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Criminal investigations in regard to his support of separatists in the Donbas with military hardware are ongoing. Rostislav Teslyuk committed violent acts against counter-demonstrators and organised car rallies to intimidate Ukrainian	20.5.2025

			<p>minors seeking refuge in Germany, together with Elena Kolbasnikova. He thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of a Member State (Germany) through activities aimed at undermining the democratic political process in Germany. He is also responsible for actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine the security of a third country (Ukraine) through instigating or facilitating an armed conflict, by his support for separatist movements in Ukraine.</p> <p>Rostislav Teslyuk is associated with Elena Kolbasnikova, who is subject to restrictive measures, through joint efforts in destabilising activities.</p>	
23.	Alina LIPP	<p>Function: war correspondent          DOB: 17.9.1993          POB: Hamburg          Nationality: German          Gender: female</p>	<p>Alina Lipp runs the blog “Neues aus Russland”, in which she systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating German public sentiment as regards support for Ukraine.</p> <p>Furthermore, she is using her role as a war correspondent with the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine to spread Russian war propaganda. She regularly appears in troop entertainment and propaganda shows on the Russian military TV channel Zvezda.</p> <p>Thus, Alina Lipp is engaging in and supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten security and stability in the Union and in a third country (Ukraine) through the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference, and through facilitating an armed conflict in a third country.</p>	20.5.2025
24.	Viktor Volodymyrovych MEDVEDCHUK (Ukrainian: Віктор Володимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)	<p>Function: Politician, businessman, de facto media owner          DOB: 7.8.1954</p>	<p>Viktor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician and businessman, who has been the leading proponent of a pro-Russian policy in Ukraine and who has promoted policies and actions</p>	20.5.2025

	<p>(Russian: Виктор Владимирович МЕДВЕДЧУК)</p>	<p>POB: Pochet, Krasnoyarskiy Krai, Russian SFSR, USSR  Nationality: Russian  Gender: male  Address: Moscow  Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 1994214296  (void)</p>	<p>intended to erode the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of Ukraine. Viktor Medvedchuk has close personal ties to, and is associated with, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. Through his associates, including Artem Marchevskiy, Viktor Medvedchuk controlled Ukrainian media outlets and used them to disseminate pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine and beyond. After the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Viktor Medvedchuk spread Russian propaganda narratives about the war, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty. To that end, in April 2023, Viktor Medvedchuk founded a political movement in Russia called “Another Ukraine”. With his associates and associated entities, including Artem Marchevskiy and the Voice of Europe media channel, and in close coordination with the Russian authorities, Viktor Medvedchuk has continued funding and carrying out influence operations targeting political parties and individual politicians in Europe. Those activities aimed to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and to spread its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Those activities included providing financial resources to individual political actors in Europe, including selected candidates in the European Parliament elections, and for cooperation with journalists. Viktor Medvedchuk has directed and maintained control over the malign activities of Artem Marchevskiy and Voice of Europe, using Artem Marchevskiy’s de facto direction of Voice of Europe. Therefore, Viktor Medvedchuk is responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in a third country, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of</p>	
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			Ukraine, through planning, directing, engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.	
25.	<p>Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKYI</p> <p>Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIJ</p> <p>Artem Pavlovich MARCHEVSKIY</p> <p>Artëm Pavlovič MARČEVSKIJ</p> <p>(Ukrainian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСЬКИЙ)</p> <p>(Russian: Артем Павлович МАРЧЕВСКИЙ)</p>	<p>Function: Politician, media producer, propagandist</p> <p>DOB: 5.7.1988</p> <p>POB: Kyiv, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, (now Ukraine)</p> <p>Nationality: Ukrainian, Israeli</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Address: Hovorčovická 1079, 250 65 Líbeznice, Czech Republic</p> <p>Ukrainian Tax ID (Код ДРФО): 3232824038</p>	<p>Artem Marchevskyi is a former Ukrainian politician closely associated with Viktor Medvedchuk, a former Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close connections to the Government of the Russian Federation. By virtue of his position in the pro-Russian party “Opposition Platform – For Life” and in a TV channel involved in pro-Russian propaganda, Artem Marchevskyi supported and provided assistance to Viktor Medvedchuk in the years 2018 to 2021. Artem Marchevskyi and Viktor Medvedchuk continued to coordinate after they both left Ukraine following the Russian invasion in 2022, with Viktor Medvedchuk directing and controlling Artem Marchevskyi’s activities facilitating construction of Medvedchuk’s influence network in the Union and its Member States. Artem Marchevskyi has played an instrumental role in disseminating concerted disinformation and biased narratives aimed at supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and spreading its influence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, by undermining the credibility and public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia’s war of aggression. Artem Marchevskyi played a key role in the acquisition of the media brand “Voice of Europe” and the incorporation of its activity in a company of the same name. As the concealed head of Voice of Europe, Artem Marchevskyi has used the company to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists, and to build an influence network</p>	20.5.2025

			<p>connecting Medvedchuk and his associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Artem Marchevskiy is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process and through planning, directing and engaging in the use of information manipulation and interference.</p>	
26.	<p>Natallia SUDLIANKOVA A.k.a.: Natallia SUDLENKOVA Natalia SUDLENKOVA Natalia SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ) Natalija SUDLIANKOVÁ (ŠEVKOVÁ) (Russian: Наталья СУДЛЕНКОВА (ШЕВКО)) Alias: Natalya KORNELYUK (Russian: Наталья КОРНЕЛЮК)</p>	<p>Function: Journalist, Media and PR Consultant, Coordinator DOB: 9.6.1964 POB: Belarus Nationality: Belarusian Gender: female Address: Borovanského 2381/22, 155 00 Prague, Czech Republic Identity documents: Travel document: U0002974, valid until 18.3.2031 Residence Permit: 001631077, valid until 13.3.2034</p>	<p>Natallia Sudliankova is a journalist and a media and PR consultant who has been producing custom-made media products that included information manipulation and spreading misleading narratives aiming to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation and aiming to undermine the public trust towards Czech national and European Union democratic values and processes. Sudliankova has been receiving assignments over a long period of time and has been financially rewarded. She plays a significant role in planning and directing coordinated information manipulation intended for the public in the Czech Republic and in other Member States, and cooperates with Russian state entities (Rosatom, Pravfond), entities representing the interests of the Russian Federation (Immortal Regiment of Russia), and Alexey Nikolayevich Shavrov, an officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). Therefore, Natallia Sudliankova is responsible for actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States and of Ukraine, through planning, directing and</p>	20.5.2025

			engaging in the use of information manipulation.	
27.	Iurie NECULITI (Russian: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ)	Function: CEO of Stark Industries Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova Gender: male Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova	Iurie Neculiti is CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world. Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies. Therefore, as CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Neculiti is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. Iurie Neculiti is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Stark Industries.	20.5.2025
28.	Ivan NECULITI (Russian: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ)	Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ Hosting Nationality: of the Republic of Moldova Gender: male Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom; Chisinau, Republic of Moldova POB: Bender, Republic of Moldova	Ivan Neculiti is the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world. Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide these activities from European law enforcement and security agencies. Ivan Neculiti is associated with Iurie Neculiti and Stark Industries. Therefore, as the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. Ivan Neculiti is supporting actions by the	20.5.2025

			Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and in a third country, by facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest.	
29.	Andrei KHARKOVSKY (Russian: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ)	Function: Leading member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad Nationality: Russian POB: Tomsk Region, Russia Gender: male Address: Germany	Andrei Kharkovsky is a Russian citizen living in Germany. In Germany, Kharkovsky functions as a representative of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, including by organising military-style gatherings for its members. The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad is an entity linked to the Government of the Russian Federation, and partaking in Russia's war of aggression and acts of violence in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists under the premise of a "historical mission" to reinstate Russian control over southern and eastern Ukraine. As a member of the Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad, Kharkovsky is engaging in acts of violence. Andrei Kharkovsky is therefore supporting actions of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine the sovereignty and security of Ukraine by attempting to overthrow the constitutional order of Ukraine.	20.5.2025
30.	Anatoli Yurevich ABRAMOV (Russian: Анатолий Юрьевич АБРАМОВ)	Function: Director of the General Radio Frequency Centre branch in the Northwestern Federal District Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Anatoly Abramov is the director of the General Radio Frequency Centre's Northwestern Federal District branch. Branch heads are appointed and dismissed by the Director of the GRFC in agreement with Roskomnadzor, and act on behalf of the GRFC. He oversees the use of radio frequencies and devices in the Kaliningrad region. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have	20.5.2025

			<p>disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC. Therefore, Anatoly Abramov is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States, through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure.</p>	
31.	<p>Ruslan Vasilyevich NESTERENKO (Russian: Руслан Васильевич НЕСТЕРЕНКО)</p>	<p>Function: Acting General Director of the GRFC Nationality: Russian Gender: male</p>	<p>Ruslan Nesterenko is the acting general director of the General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC). He oversees the use of radio frequencies and ensures compliance with legislation.</p> <p>Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, Russia, including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States and disrupting civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC.</p> <p>Under Nesterenko’s direction, the GRFC is involved in planning and supporting information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. As per the GRFC Charter, the general director represents the enterprise’s interests within Russia and beyond its borders.</p> <p>Therefore, Ruslan Nesterenko is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.</p>	20.5.2025

32.	<p>Viktor Aleksandrovitch LUKOVENKO (Russian: Виктор Александрович ЛУКОВЕНКО) Alias Viktor VASILEV (Russian: Виктор ВАСИЛЬЕВ)</p>	<p>Function: Head of the news agency “African Initiative” DOB: 6.4.1985 Nationality: Uzbek Gender: male</p>	<p>Viktor Lukovenko has been active on the African continent for several years, previously as a member of the Wagner Group and now as the head of the news agency “African Initiative”. He is involved in spreading Russian propaganda on the continent. He is linked to well known figures of Russian propaganda in Africa. Additionally, Viktor Lukovenko was sent to Ukraine in 2022 before the war, under the supervision of a GRU colonel, in order to recruit pro-Russian sympathisers. Viktor Lukovenko is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, supporting and facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.</p>	20.5.2025
33.	<p>Oleg Anatoliyovych VOLOSHIN (Ukrainian: Олег Анатолійович ВОЛОШИН) (Russian: Олег Анатольевич ВОЛОШИН)</p>	<p>Nationality: Russian DOB: 7.4.1981 POB: Nikolaev, USSR (now Ukraine) Passport No.: ET870130 ID-No.: 1981040705733; 2968200719 Gender: male</p>	<p>Oleg Voloshin is a former Ukrainian member of parliament and a member of the pro-Russian political party “Opposition Platform – For Life” (OPFL). He is part of the network behind “Voice of Europe” and is active at Golos.eu and PolitWera, both platforms spreading disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. He was involved in bribe payments made to Western politicians. Oleg Voloshin has used his position as Ukrainian delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2019-2023) to implement the strategy of Russian interference in Europe led by pro-Russian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, who leads OPFL. In particular, Voloshin has promoted Medvedchuk’s “peace plan” for Ukraine, which is linked to the Russian narrative regarding Russia’s war of aggression. In order to win-over European elected representatives to his cause, he has organised conferences with French and German parliamentarians, arguing that the “Normandy format” (France, Germany,</p>	20.5.2025

			<p>Ukraine, Russia) has a so-called parliamentary dimension outside any official framework. The most recent event was organised by Voloshin at the French Senate on 11 February 2022 (“Peace process in Ukraine: how to break the deadlock”), a few days before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army.</p> <p>Thus, Oleg Voloshin is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union and its Member States, including Germany, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly and indirectly, the obstruction and undermining of the democratic political process.</p>	
34.	Justin Blaise TAGOUH (Russian: Жюстин Блез ТАГУ)	<p>Function: CEO of press group International Afrique Media (IAM), which includes the TV channel Afrique Média, IAM press review, and Courrier Confidentiel DOB: 1959 Gender: male</p>	<p>Justin Tagouh is CEO of the press group International Africa Media. This media group has direct links with the Russian authorities, and spreads Russian narrative and anti-western narrative in African countries.</p> <p>Justin Tagouh is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	20.5.2025
35.	Mikhaïl Mikhaïlovich PRUDNIKOV Alias “Micha” (Russian: Михаил Михайлович ПРУДНИКОВ)	<p>Function: Member of Africa Politology, entity responsible for disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Central African Republic POB: Tambov Oblast Nationality: Russian Gender: male</p>	<p>Mikhaïl Prudnikov is a Russian disinformation activist operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) who has close links with the Wagner galaxy and disinformation campaign holdings in CAR through various newspapers and networks. In particular, he developed a narrative against western countries and participated in communication actions in order to undermine and threaten the Union’s image in the CAR.</p>	20.5.2025

			Mikhaïl Prudnikov is therefore responsible for, implementing, and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	
36.	Sylvain AFOUA (Russian: Сильвен АФУА) Alias Egountchi BEHANZIN (Russian: Эгунчи БЕХАНЗИН)	Function: Founder of the pan-African group “Ligue de défense noire Africaine” (LDNA); influencer/activist known by the pseudonym “Egountchi Behanzin” DOB: 5.11.1988 POB: Madjikpeto, Togo Nationality: French, Togolese Gender: male Website: www.egountchibehanzin.com	Sylvain Afoua is a pro-Russian activist, founder of the “ <i>Ligue de défense noire Africaine</i> ” (LDNA) (Black African Defence League), a group involved in hit actions on French territory. The structure was dissolved by a French ministerial decree of 29 September 2021 for spreading an ideology calling for hatred, discrimination and violence. Sylvain Afoua spreads Russian narratives and misinformation on the war of aggression against Ukraine, which he carries out in particular on the African continent. His message is transmitted via social networks and his association’s website. He is regularly invited to Russian fora and is, furthermore, financially linked to the Wagner Group. Sylvain Afoua is therefore responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security of the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	20.5.2025
37.	Thomas RÖPER (Russian: Томас РЁПЕР)	Function: war correspondent DOB: 26.11.1971 POB: Bremen Nationality: German Gender: male	Thomas Röper is a German blogger. Through his network of online channels named “Anti-Spiegel”, he systematically disseminates misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and delegitimises the Ukrainian government, especially with a view to manipulating	20.5.2025

			<p>German public sentiment regarding support to Ukraine. Furthermore, he legitimises Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory by serving as an election “observer” and participating in a campaign to promote Russia’s illegal referendum on the secession from Ukraine of the Russian-occupied territories. Moreover, he has served as a spokesperson for the Government of the Russian Federation to disseminate Russian propaganda narratives, including at the UN Arria-forum. Thomas Röper is therefore engaging in and supporting the use of information manipulation and interference and facilitates an armed conflict in a third country.</p>	
38.	Nathalie YAMB	<p>DOB: 22.7.1969          POB: La Chaux-de-Fonds, Switzerland          Nationality: Swiss and Cameroonian          Gender: female</p>	<p>Nathalie Yamb is a social media influencer. Since the Sochi summit she attended in 2019, Nathalie Yamb has been an outspoken supporter of Russia, adopting Moscow’s language and targeting France and the West in particular, with a view to ousting them from the African continent. She has specific ties with AFRIC, an organisation linked to Russian private military companies. Therefore, Nathalie Yamb is supporting actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in its Member States by engaging in the use of information manipulation.</p>	26.6.2025
39.	Andrey Yuryevich ROMANCHENKO (Russian: Андрей Юрьевич РОМАНЧЕНКО)	<p>Function: General Director of the Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS)          DOB: 16.10.1960          POB: Moscow, Russian SSR (now Russian Federation)          Nationality: Russian          Gender: male          Russian Tax ID (ИИИ): 771515786260</p>	<p>Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko is the General Director of The Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance, operating terrestrial radio and television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Romanchenko, who was appointed as General Director by the Russian President, directs the RTRS, which plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation by providing the</p>	15.7.2025

			<p>infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called ‘All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels’ such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda.</p> <p>Under Romanchenko’s leadership, RTRS has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied territories is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the exclusive right to establish transmission infrastructure in the occupied territories. By overseeing and directing these operations, Romanchenko actively facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information, thereby assuming responsibility for the use of information manipulation.</p> <p>Therefore, Romanchenko, as the head of RTRS, benefits from and implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.</p>	
40.	Vladimir NAIDENOV (Russian: Владимир НАЙДЕНОВ)	Function: Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories of the Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and	Vladimir Naidenov is the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at the Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS), a Russian federal unitary for-profit enterprise of strategic significance operating terrestrial radio and	15.7.2025

		<p>Radio Broadcasting Network' (RTRS)  Gender: male  Nationality: Russian</p>	<p>television broadcasting infrastructure in Russia. Vladimir Naidenov, is subordinated to the RTRS General Director Andrey Yuryevich Romanchenko, who directs the RTRS and plays a direct role in implementing policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called 'All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels' such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24 which disseminate Russian state propaganda. In his position within the RTRS, Vladimir Naidenov has played a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine's governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there. Therefore, Vladimir Naidenov, as the Director of the Department for Coordination of Communications Infrastructure Development in New Territories at RTRS, facilitates the obstruction of access to diverse and independent information by coordinating the RTRS infrastructure development in the occupied Ukrainian territories and thus implements policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference</p>	
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41.	Dmitri BUIMISTRU	<p>Function: TV presenter, actor; blogger          DOB: 26.11.1992          POB: Chişinău, Republic of Moldova          Nationality: Moldovan          Gender: male</p>	<p>Dmitri Buimistru intentionally engages in coordinated information manipulation and interference by operating as a key propagandist on MD24, a Russia-based online TV channel created by Ilan Shor following license withdrawals from his previous stations for disseminating Russian disinformation. To that end, Buimistru deliberately spreads demonstrably false claims – systematically debunked by independent fact-checkers – regarding NATO drawing Moldova into conflict, imminent revocation of constitutional neutrality, ‘Romanization’ of institutions, misrepresentation of the EU referendum’s constitutional implications, and fabricated trade statistics.</p> <p>Furthermore, his participation in synchronised cross-platform disinformation campaigns is evidenced by the July 2023 Russian embassy surveillance equipment scandal, where his messaging was perfectly coordinated with other pro-Kremlin outlets, demonstrating centralised orchestration. In addition, Buimistru’s ‘SOSEDI’ project has been identified as a key tool in a broader external influence operation. His systematic promotion of other pro-Russian information sources and deployment of consistent messaging tactics specifically designed to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty, European integration, and democratic processes further confirms his deliberate engagement in coordinated information manipulation with a view to serving Russian destabilisation interests in Moldova.</p> <p>Therefore, Dmitri Buimistru is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability in a third country through engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	15.7.2025
42.	Veaceslav VALICO	Function: Activist	Veaceslav Valico participated, alongside Anatolii Prizenko,	15.7.2025

		<p>DOB: 10.8.1977</p> <p>POB: Chişinău, Republic of Moldova</p> <p>Nationality: Moldovan</p> <p>Gender: male</p>	<p>a natural person listed by the Union, in the Russian destabilisation operation concerning the painting of the Star of David on the streets of Paris following the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel in exchange for financial compensation and in order to create tensions in French society. Moreover, Veaceslav Valico is involved in the systematic dissemination of disinformation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Russian Federation's malign hybrid activities.</p> <p>Furthermore, Veaceslav Valico is associated with Anatolii Prizenko, who is an individual listed by the Union. Their association predates their collaboration in the Paris incident.</p> <p>Therefore, Veaceslav Valico is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the stability in a Member State and therefore, in the Union, and in third countries, through planning, directing, and engaging in, directly or indirectly, the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	
43.	Simeon BOIKOV	<p>Function: Pro-Russian blogger</p> <p>Date of birth: 15.2.1990</p> <p>Place of birth: Sydney, Australia</p> <p>Gender: male</p> <p>Nationality: Australian/Russian</p>	<p>Simeon Boikov is an Australian pro-Russian activist known by the pseudonym 'Aussie Cossack'. He is recognised for disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives and misinformation, particularly regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Boikov has also been implicated in spreading disinformation related to the 2024 U.S. presidential election, notably by paying an American influencer to post a Storm-1516 fabricated video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia.</p> <p>Therefore, Simeon Boikov is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in,</p>	15.7.2025

			directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
44.	Vitaly KULIKOV (Russian: Виталий КУЛИКОВ)	Function: Lieutenant Colonel in the Russian military, heading the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Kulikov is the commander of the Electronic Warfare (EW) center of the Baltic Fleet also known as the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center. Vitaly Kulikov oversees exercises of his EW troops in the Kaliningrad region. GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and ‘spoofing’ of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The EW center of the Baltic Fleet, under Kulikov’s commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas, and is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. Therefore, Vitaly Kulikov is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.	15.7.2025
45.	Yuri Illarionovich LASTOCHKIN (Russian: Юрий Илларионович ЛАСТОЧКИН Ukrainian: Юрій Ілларионович ЛАСТОЧКІН)	Function: Official of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation; Military Leader; General-Major/Lieutenant General; Chief of the Electronic Warfare Forces of the Russian Federation/head of Russian Defense Ministry’s Radio-Electronic Warfare (REB) force DOB: 18.8.1967 POB: Rzhavka, Mogilev region, Belarusian SSR (now Belarus) Nationality: Russian	Lieutenant General Yuri Lastochkin is the chief of the Electronic Warfare (EW) Forces of the Russian Federation. Yuri Lastochkin oversees actions and exercises of Russia’s EW troops, including those of the 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad, including jamming and ‘spoofing’ of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The 841st Separate EW center in the Kaliningrad region, under	15.7.2025

		Gender: male	Lastochkin's commands, has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas; it is also involved in planning, supporting and executing coordinated information manipulation and interference that impacts Union Member States. Therefore, Y. I. Lastochkin is responsible for planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.	
46.	Yevgeny Shevchenko (Russian: Евгений ШЕВЧЕНКО)	Function: Founder of TigerWeb Nationality: Russian Gender: male Tax identification number: 910202780107	Yevgeny Shevchenko is a web developer who has specialised in creating websites for many years. He is the founder of Tigerweb, the web-company that runs the informational manipulation set 'Portal Kombat' which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, on several so-called 'informational portals'. Therefore, he is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025
47.	Aleksey Nikolayevich SHAVROV (Russian: Алексей Николаевич ШАВРОВ) a.k.a. Andrey PETROV (Russian: Андрей ПЕТРОВ)	Function: Military Intelligence Officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) DOB: 12.12.1989 Nationality: Russian Gender: male	Aleksey Shavrov is a GRU officer involved in Russian influence operations directed to destabilise the Union and its Member States. Aleksey Shavrov's malign activities include information manipulation and disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic and other Union Member States. Through his concealed associate, Natallia Sudliankova, Aleksey Shavrov conducts influence campaigns, including by organising the dissemination of tailor-made articles in various European media outlets. Misleading or outright false narratives aim to support the foreign policy interests of the	15.7.2025

			<p>Russian Federation and to spread its influence. Moreover, the content is designed to further undermine public trust in the Union values and processes, democracy and Union cohesion. Articles also contain specific manipulative anti-NATO, anti-Ukraine and anti-NGO narratives. Aleksey Shavrov instructed Natallia Sudliankova to spread and disseminate those divisive messages through media to amplify their polarising content. Aleksey Shavrov provided financial rewards for accomplishing tasks and for publication of those custom-made pro-Russian media campaigns.</p> <p>Therefore, Aleksey Shavrov is implementing actions or policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in third countries by planning and directing the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	
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B. Lögfrøðiligir persónar, eindir og stovnar

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Identifying information</b>	<b>Statement of reasons</b>	<b>Date of listing</b>
1.	GRU Unit 29155 ФКУ 'Войсковая Часть 29155	Place of registration: 105077, Moscow 11th Parkovaya Street, 38A Registration No: 7719737879 OGRN: 1097746770395	GRU Unit 29155 is a covert unit within the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU), known for its involvement in foreign assassinations and destabilisation activities across Europe. Through coups, assassinations, bombings, and cyberattacks against other countries around the world in connection with the war in Ukraine, it has sought to create chaos and destabilise European Union countries. By carrying out such actions, it seeks to help and benefit Russia. GRU Unit 29155 carried out cyberattacks and other attacks against critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is responsible for, implementing, supporting or benefiting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing,	16.12.2024

			engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating acts of violence, as well as planning, directing, engaging in, supporting or otherwise facilitating any actions aimed at interfering with, damaging or destroying, including through sabotage or malicious cyber activities as part of hybrid activities, critical infrastructure.	
2.	Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement GPCI	Place of registration: Lomé, Togo Date of registration: January 2022	<i>Groupe Panafricain pour le Commerce et l'Investissement</i> (GPCI) is a disinformation network carrying out pro-Russian covert influence operations, particularly in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. GPCI was dismantled by Meta in May 2023. Despite this, GPCI is still active and is running structured and coordinated disinformation campaigns with the use of a vast network of information chains. Those campaigns target France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilisation operations or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States. GPCI has been indirectly funded by the Wagner Group. Therefore, GPCI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, stability or security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	16.12.2024
3.	African Initiative	Place of Registration: Moscow, Russia Date of registration: September 2023	African Initiative is a news agency that operates on the African continent. It has been involved in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation against the West, and has hired journalists and influencers for the purpose of spreading Russian propaganda. It has also organised press tours for African journalists in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, during which pro-Russian	16.12.2024

			<p>narratives about the war were spread. African Initiative has also organised events serving the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation, including by facilitating access to mineral resources.</p> <p>Therefore, African Initiative is responsible for or supporting actions and policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Union or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	
4.	<p>AFA Media aka RED AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi aka RED AFA Медиа</p>	<p>Address: Kavacık Mahallesi, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Caddesi, Tonoglu Block No.: 3, Beykoz, Istanbul, Türkiye Type of entity: media company Place of registration: Istanbul Date of registration: 22.11.2022 VAT Nr.: 0081804196 Registration number 423277-5 Principle place of business: Türkiye Website: <a href="https://thered.stream/imprint/">https://thered.stream/imprint/</a> Founder: Hüseyin Dogru</p>	<p>AFA Medya A.Ş. is a media company based in Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ş. operates “RED”, which comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organisational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organisations.</p> <p>RED has used its media platforms – often publishing under “redstreamnet” or “thered.stream” – to systematically spread false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience, including by disseminating the narratives of radical Islamic terrorist groups such as Hamas.</p> <p>During the violent occupation of a German university by anti-Israel rioters, Red personnel coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate their vandalism – which included the use of Hamas symbols – through RED’s online channels, thus providing them with an exclusive media platform.</p> <p>AFA Medya Anonim Şirketi thus supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation that</p>	20.5.2025

			undermine stability and security in the Union and in one or several of its Member States, including by indirectly supporting and facilitating violent demonstrations and engaging in information manipulation.	
5.	Voice of Europe (Russian: Голос Европы)	Address: Krakovská 583/9, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic Website: www.voiceofeurope.com , www.voiceofeurope.eu Type of entity: Limited Liability Company (s.r.o.) Place of registration: Prague Date of registration: 14.3.2023 Registration number: CZ05185327 Principal place of business: Czech Republic	Voice of Europe is an online media outlet, engaged in a systematic international campaign of media manipulation and distortion of facts through its website and accounts on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram and X. Voice of Europe disseminated concerted disinformation related to Ukraine, the Union and its Member States with the aim of supporting the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. It systematically undermined the public image of Ukraine and its efforts to defend itself against Russia's war of aggression, and the credibility of the assistance of the Union and its Member States to Ukraine's defence, including ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Through its activities, Voice of Europe is implementing and supporting actions or policies of the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in the Union and in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of several of its Member States, through engaging in and otherwise facilitating the obstruction or undermining of the democratic political process, including the 2024 European Parliament elections, and through engaging in the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference. Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessperson with close ties to the leadership of the Russian Federation, through his associate Artem Marchevskyi. Voice of Europe was used to funnel financial resources designated for the remuneration of propagandists and the building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his	20.5.2025

			<p>associates with representatives of political parties in Europe. Therefore, Voice of Europe was involved in activities facilitating the construction of Viktor Medvedchuk's influence network in the Union and its Member States.</p>	
6.	Norebo JSC	<p>Address: Office 510, 43 Schmidta Street, 183038 Murmansk, Russian Federation  Type of entity: Joint Stock Company  Place of registration: Murmansk  Date of registration: 2.11.2007  Registration number: 1201000007889  TIN / KPP: 2901170107 / 519001001</p>	<p>Norebo JSC is a Russian fishing company. Vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC show particular movement patterns that are inconsistent with regular economic practices and fishing activities. The movement patterns align with malign objectives, such as repeatedly being in the vicinity of or loitering near critical infrastructure and military sites. The movement patterns have been linked, including by Member States and the authorities of third states, to the Russian state-sponsored surveillance campaign that employs inter alia, civilian fishing trawlers, to conduct espionage missions directed against civilian and military infrastructure in the North and Baltic Sea. Those activities can facilitate future sabotage operations. Shipping vessels owned and operated by Norebo JSC have also been equipped with technology that may be used for espionage. A Norebo JSC vessel has been banned from entering Dutch port facilities due to espionage. Norebo JSC has also received several loans from Sberbank, a Russian state-owned bank. Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new "maritime doctrine", which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time. Norebo JSC thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation, which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.</p>	20.5.2025

7.	<p>Murman SeaFood (Russian: Мурман СиФуд, Мурманские морепродукты)</p>	<p>Address: Ulitsa Karla Marksa, 28, Murmansk, Murmansk Oblast, Russian Federation, 183025 Type of entity: limited liability company Place of registration: Murmansk</p>	<p>Murman SeaFood (MSF) is a Russian fishing company. Melkart-5 (Russian: Мелькарт-5), a vessel owned and operated by MSF, has repeatedly shown untypical behaviour inconsistent with its regular economic practices and fishing activities, including its presence in close vicinity to an ongoing NATO military exercise, and regular presence close to Norwegian critical infrastructure and military sites. In particular Melkart-5 showed highly unusual navigation practices in the immediate vicinity of a subsea cable in the Norwegian North Sea, crossing the cable multiple times, immediately before the cable was severely damaged. In addition, crew of Melkart-5 violated Norwegian on-shoring regulations while being caught setting off to investigate a Norwegian bridge critical for military logistic purposes in a clandestine manner. Moreover, in July 2022, Russia released its new “maritime doctrine”, which emphasises the strategic importance of civilian ships and their crews for maritime readiness, including by preparing them for wartime, and allowing them to be used by the armed forces in peace time. MSF thus implements and supports actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the security in the Union, several of its Member States and third countries by engaging in and supporting actions aimed at interfering with critical infrastructure, including submarine infrastructure.</p>	20.5.2025
8.	<p>Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre” General Radio Frequency Centre GRFC Федеральное Государственное Унитарное Предприятие “Главный Радиочастотный Центр”</p>	<p>Address: 7, Derbenevskaya nab. 7 p., Moscow 115114. 15 115114, город Москва, Дербеневская наб, д. 7 стр. 15 Type of entity: Federal agency Place of registration: Moscow, Russian Federation Date of registration: 30.3.2001 BIN: 1027739334479</p>	<p>The General Radio Frequency Centre (GRFC) is responsible for ensuring the proper use of radio frequencies and devices for civil purposes, and monitors compliance with legislation. It is one of the main organisations which contribute to decisions about the use and supervision of the radio frequency sector. Recently, GPS signal failures in several European countries have been linked to electronic warfare activities from Kaliningrad,</p>	20.5.2025

	ФГУП “ГРЧЦ”	INN: 7706228218 KPP: 772501001 Principal place of business: Russia	including jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. These activities have disrupted civil aviation. The repression of GPS signals requires the permission of the GRFC. The electronic warfare centre in Kaliningrad has received new jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas. Therefore, GRFC is responsible for, planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability or security in the Union or in several of its Member States through engaging in actions which are targeted at the functioning of critical infrastructure and through supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	
9.	Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.	Date of registration: 10.2.2022 Address: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom (maildrop address) Registration number: 13906017 Website: <a href="https://stark-industries.solutions/">https://stark-industries.solutions/</a> Website: <a href="https://pq.hosting/">https://pq.hosting/</a>	Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is a web hosting service registered as a maildrop company in the United Kingdom. Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and operated by the Moldavian nationals Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti, through the web hosting service PQ Hosting. The company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world. Stark enables various Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated actors to conduct destabilising activities, including coordinated information manipulation and interference and cyber-attacks against the Union and third countries, by providing services intended to hide those activities from European law enforcement and security agencies. Therefore, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is supporting actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten democracy and the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in one of its Member States and a third country, by facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference and by facilitating actions targeted at	20.5.2025

			the functioning of democratic institutions, economic activities or services of public interest. Stark is associated with Ivan Neculiti and Iurie Neculiti.	
10.	Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS); Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие ‘Российская телевизионная и радиовещательная сеть’	Address: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia Website: <a href="https://moscow.rtrs.ru/">https://moscow.rtrs.ru/</a> Place of registration: 13, Korolyov street, Moscow, Russia Date of registration: 30.11.2001 Registration number: ИНН: 7717127211; ОГРН: 1027739456084	The Federal State-owned Enterprise ‘Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network’ (RTRS) operates Russia’s terrestrial broadcasting infrastructure. It is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation and operates under the authority of a general director appointed by the Russian President. RTRS provides infrastructure and technical capabilities for the transmission of the so called ‘All-Russian mandatory publicly available television and radio channels’ such as Pervyi Kanal or Rossiya 24. RTRS plays a key role in effectively replacing legacy Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with a network that transmits content approved by the Government of the Russian Federation intended to suppress dissent, to align the local population with Russian policies and to delegitimise Ukraine’s governance in the occupied territories. This directly undermines the ability of local populations to access diverse and independent information. The expansion of RTRS operations into the occupied regions is facilitated by the Government of the Russian Federation which grants RTRS the right to establish transmission infrastructure there. Therefore, RTRS is implementing and benefiting from policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy and stability in Ukraine, and which undermine the sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025
11.	841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center of the Baltic Fleet	Address: 238580, Kaliningrad oblast, Yantarny settlement, Balebin street, 09643	The 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center is at the core of one of the strongest electronic warfare groups in Russia. The centre is	15.7.2025

	841-й центр радиоэлектронной борьбы	238580, Калининградская обл., пгт.Янтарный, ул.Балебина, в/ч 09643 Type of entity: Military unit Place of registration: Kaliningrad region, Russian Federation Phone number: 8(40153)37-244 Military unit 09643	responsible for using technology to disorganise any system of shortwave communication, conducting electronic warfare exercises (EW) to disrupt enemy navigation and radio communications as well as for the collection and analysis of intelligence information obtained by observing electromagnetic radiation in the short and ultrashort wave ranges. Several European countries have experienced GPS signal failures, which have been attributed to electronic warfare activities by Russia, specifically from Kaliningrad. This includes deliberate jamming and ‘spoofing’ of GPS signals, primarily affecting the Baltic States. Interference and manipulation of GPS signals has led to obstacles for landing civil planes. The 841st Separate EW Center in Kaliningrad has received jamming equipment and conducted exercises using advanced systems capable of disrupting communications over large areas. Therefore, 841st Separate EW Center, as part of Russia’s military forces enabling the misuse of radio frequency sector, is responsible for engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference which directly affects Union Member States.	
12.	BRICS Journalist Association	Website: bricspress.live	The BRICS Journalists Association (BJA) is a Russian NGO linked to the Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), created by Yevgeny Prigozhin, and headed by Oksana Vovk (Mira Terada). The BJA has been used as a vehicle to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation under the guise of independent journalism, including fake content originating from the Storm-1516 Information Manipulation Set (IMS). Therefore, the BJA is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or	15.7.2025

			threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States or in a third country through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	
13.	Center for Geopolitical Expertise Центр геополитических экспертиз, CGE	Website: <a href="http://cge.evrazia.ru">cge.evrazia.ru</a> , <a href="http://cge.su">cge.su</a> Place of registration: Ul. Dinamovskaya D.1a, Office 409, Moscow, RUS, 109044 Date of registration: 17.12.2002 Registration number: 1027739806940	The Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) is a Moscow-based think tank founded by Aleksandr Dugin, and headed by Valery Korovin, accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns aimed at targeting Ukrainian interests, discrediting Western political figures, and influencing electoral processes in Western countries. CGE and its director, Valery Mikhaylovich Korovin, are reportedly involved in creating and disseminating false information by utilising artificial intelligence tools to produce deepfake videos, and supporting a network of hundreds of fake news websites. CGE is alleged to have worked closely with Russia's military intelligence agency (GRU), receiving financial support to carry out these operations. Therefore, the CGE is responsible for, implementing, supporting and benefitting from actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten the democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.	15.7.2025
14.	Foundation to Battle Injustice	Date of creation: 23.3.2021 Website: <a href="http://fondfbr.ru">fondfbr.ru</a>	The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a fake human-rights defence NGO created in March 2021 by Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. The R-FBI has been involved in numerous information operations targeting France and Ukraine, including a campaign accusing French soldiers of having kidnapped children from Niger just after the military coup d'état in 2023. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in	15.7.2025

			<p>August 2023, the R-FBI has been involved in the amplification of numerous Storm-1516's information operations.</p> <p>Therefore, the R-FBI is responsible for, implementing and supporting actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, by planning, directing, engaging in, directly or indirectly, supporting or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	
15.	Tigerweb	<p>Website: Tigerweb.ru  Place of registration:  295000, Krim Republic,  Simferopol City,  Oktyabirskaya Street, 3,  Office 408  Date of registration:  2019  Registration number:  1199112018973</p>	<p>Tigerweb is the Russian Crimea-based web-company that operates the informational manipulation project 'Portal Kombat', which disseminates pro-Russian content and targets several Western countries, including France, through various so-called 'informational portals'.</p> <p>Therefore, Tigerweb is involved in the implementation of actions and policies attributable to the Government of the Russian Federation which threaten the stability and security in the Union, or in one or several of its Member States, or in third countries, through engaging in or otherwise facilitating the use of coordinated information manipulation and interference.</p>	15.7.2025

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**Skjal 3**

**“Skjal 1 B**

**Listi við líkamligum og lögfrøðiligum persónum, samsvarandi fylgiskjali I til fyriskipan Ráðsins nr. 2024/2642**

Samanskrivaði listin hjá Evropasamveldinum við líkamligum og lögfrøðiligum persónum, sum eru fevnd av avmarkandi tiltøkunum sambært § 3 a, samsvarandi fylgiskjali I til fyriskipan Ráðsins nr. 2024/2642, sæst á heimasíðuni hjá Uttanríkis- og mentamálaráðnum, [www.ummr.fo](http://www.ummr.fo) ”

## Listi við vörum, sum loyvt er at útflyta til Russlands samsvarandi § 13

CN Code	Description
02	Meat and edible meat offal
03	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates
04	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin; not elsewhere specified or included
05	Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included
ex 06	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage, excluding CN 0601 (Bulbs, tubers, tuberous roots, corms, crowns and rhizomes, dormant, in growth or in flower, chicory plants and roots other than roots of heading 1212:), 0602 30 (Rhododendrons and azaleas, grafted or not), 0602 40 (Roses, grafted or not), 0602 90 (Other live plants (including their roots), cuttings and slips; mushroom spawn – Other), and 0604 20 (Foliage, branches and other parts of plants, without flowers or flower buds, and grasses, mosses and lichens, being goods of a kind suitable for bouquets or for ornamental purposes, fresh, dried, dyed, bleached, impregnated or otherwise prepared – Fresh).
ex 07	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers, excluding CN 0709 56 00 (Truffles), 0710 80 69 (Other), 0711 59 00 (Other), 0712 39 00 (Other).
08	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit and melons
09	Coffee, tea, maté and spices
10	Cereals
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin, wheat gluten
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder
13	Lac; gums; resins and other vegetable saps and extracts
14	Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes
ex 16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates, excluding CN 1604 31 00 (Caviar) and 1604 32 00 (Caviar substitutes)
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products
ex 20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants, excluding 2001 90 97 (Other) and 2003 90 10 (Truffles)
ex 21	Miscellaneous edible preparations, excluding CN 2103 90 90 (Other), 2104 10 00 (Soups and broths and preparations therefor), 2104 20 00 (Homogenised composite food preparations), and 2106 00 00 (Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included)
ex 22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar, excluding CN 2203 00 00 (Beer made from malt), 2204 10 11 (Champagne), 2204 10 91 (Asti spurmante), 2204 10 93 (Other), 2204 10 94 (With a protected geographical indication (PGI)), 2204 10 96 (Other varietal wines),

	2204 10 98 (Other), 2204 21 00 (In containers holding 2 litres or less), 2204 29 00 (Other), 2205 00 00 (Vermouth and other wine of fresh grapes flavoured with plants or aromatic substances), 2206 00 00 (Other fermented beverages (for example, cider, perry, mead, saké); mixtures of fermented beverages and mixtures of fermented beverages with non-alcoholic beverages, not elsewhere specified or included), 2207 10 00 (Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of 80 % vol or higher), and 2208 00 00 (Undenatured ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength by volume of less than 80 % vol; spirits, liqueurs and other spirituous beverages)
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder
ex 24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes, excluding CN 2402 10 00 (Cigars, cheroots and cigarillos, containing tobacco) and 2402 90 00 (Other)
2505	Natural sands of all kinds, whether or not coloured, other than metal-bearing sands of Chapter 26
2707	Oils and other products of the distillation of high temperature coal tar; similar products in which the weight of the aromatic constituents exceeds that of the non-aromatic constituents, excluding 2707 30 (Xylol (xylenes))
2710 19	Medium oils and preparations, of petroleum or bituminous minerals, not containing biodiesel, n.e.s.
2711	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons
2716	Electrical energy
2853	Phosphides, whether or not chemically defined, excluding ferrophosphorus; other inorganic compounds (including distilled or conductivity water and water of similar purity); liquid air (whether or not rare gases have been removed); compressed air; amalgams, other than amalgams of precious metals
2932	Heterocyclic compounds with oxygen hetero-atom(s) only
3005	Wadding, gauze, bandages and the like, e.g. dressings, adhesive plasters, poultices, impregnated or covered with pharmaceutical substances or put up for retail sale for medical, surgical, dental or veterinary purposes
3006	Pharmaceutical preparations and products of subheadings 3006 10 10 to 3006 93 00
3215 90	Ink, whether or not concentrated or solid (excl. printing ink)
3401	Soap; organic surface-active products and preparations for use as soap, in the form of bars, cakes, moulded pieces or shapes, whether or not containing soap; organic surface-active products and preparations for washing the skin, in the form of liquid or cream and put up for retail sale, whether or not containing soap; paper, wadding, felt and nonwovens, impregnated, coated or covered with soap or detergent
3402	Organic surface-active agents (other than soap); surface-active preparations, washing preparations (including auxiliary washing preparations) and cleaning preparations, whether or not containing soap, other than those of heading 3401
3503	Gelatin (including gelatin in rectangular (including square) sheets, whether or not surface-worked or coloured) and gelatin derivatives; isinglass; other glues of animal origin, excluding casein glues of heading 3501
3506 10	Products suitable for use as glues or adhesives, put up for retail sale as glues or adhesives, not exceeding a net weight of 1 kg
3506 91	Adhesives based on polymers of headings 3901 to 3913 or on rubber (excl. put up for retail sale with a net weight of ≤ 1 kg)
3801	Artificial graphite; colloidal or semi-colloidal graphite; preparations based on graphite or other carbon in the form of pastes, blocks, plates or other semi-manufactures, excluding CN 3801 20 (colloidal or semi-colloidal graphite)

3822	Diagnostic or laboratory reagents on a backing, prepared diagnostic or laboratory reagents whether or not on a backing, other than those of heading 3002 or 3006; certified reference materials
3901	Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms, excluding CN 3901 40 (ethylene-alpha-olefin copolymers, having a specific gravity of < 0,94, in primary forms) and 3208 (solutions of products of headings 3901 to 3913 in volatile organic solvents, containing > 50 % solvent by weight (excl. solutions of collodion))
3907 30	Epoxide resins, in primary forms
3919	Self-adhesive plates, sheets, film, foil, tape, strip and other flat shapes, of plastics, whether or not in rolls
3923	Articles for the conveyance or packing of goods, of plastics; stoppers, lids, caps and other closures, of plastics
3924	Tableware, kitchenware, other household articles and hygienic or toilet articles, of plastics
3926	Articles of plastics and articles of other materials of heading 3901 to 3914, n.e.s., excluding CN 3926 90
4001	Natural rubber, balata, gutta-percha, guayule, chicle and similar natural gums, in primary forms or in plates, sheets or strip
4003	Reclaimed rubber in primary forms or in plates, sheets or strip
4004	Waste, parings and scrap of rubber (other than hard rubber) and powders and granules obtained therefrom
4006	Other forms (for example, rods, tubes and profile shapes) and articles (for example, discs and rings), of unvulcanised rubber, excluding CN 4006 10 ('camel-back' strips of unvulcanised rubber, for retreading rubber tyres)
4009	Tubes, pipes and hoses, of vulcanised rubber other than hard rubber, with or without their fittings (for example, joints, elbows, flanges), excluding CN 4009 12 (tubes, pipes and hoses, of vulcanised rubber (excl. hard rubber), not reinforced or otherwise) and 4009 41 (tubes, pipes and hoses, of vulcanised rubber (excl. hard rubber), reinforced or otherwise combined with materials other than metal or textile materials, without fittings)
4011	New pneumatic tyres, of rubber, excluding CN 4011 20 (New pneumatic tyres, of rubber, of a kind used for buses and lorries) and 4011 80 (New pneumatic tyres, of rubber, of a kind used on construction, mining or industrial handling vehicles and machines)
4015 11	Gloves, mittens and mitts, of a kind used for medical, surgical, dental or veterinary purposes, of vulcanised rubber
4016	Other articles of vulcanised rubber other than hard rubber, excluding 4016 93 (gaskets, washers and other seals, of vulcanised rubber (excl. hard rubber and those of cellular rubber))
4415	Packing cases, boxes, crates, drums and similar packings, of wood; cable-drums of wood; pallets, box pallets and other load boards, of wood; pallet collars of wood (excl. containers specially designed and equipped for one or more modes of transport)
4802 56	Packing cases, boxes, crates, drums and similar packings, of wood; cable-drums of wood; pallets, box pallets and other load boards, of wood; pallet collars of wood (excl. containers specially designed and equipped for one or more modes of transport)
4802 62	Uncoated paper and paperboard, of a kind used for writing, printing or other graphic purposes, and non-perforated punchcards and punch-tape paper, in square or rectangular sheets with one side ≤ 435 mm and the other side ≤ 297 mm in the unfolded state, of which > 10% by weight of the total fibre content consists of fibres obtained by a mechanical or chemi-mechanical process, n.e.s.
4818	Toilet paper and similar paper, cellulose wadding or webs of cellulose fibres, of a kind used for household or sanitary purposes, in rolls of a width ≤ 36 cm, or cut to size or shape; handkerchiefs, cleansing tissues, towels, tablecloths, serviettes, bedsheets and similar household, sanitary or hospital articles, articles of apparel and clothing accessories, of paper pulp, paper, cellulose wadding or webs of cellulose fibres

4819	Cartons, boxes, cases, bags and other packing containers, of paper, paperboard, cellulose wadding or webs of cellulose fibres; box files, letter trays, and similar articles, of paper or paperboard of a kind used in offices, shops or the like, excluding 4819 20 (folding cartons, boxes and cases, of non-corrugated paper or paperboard)
4820	Registers, account books, notebooks, order books, receipt books, letter pads, memorandum pads, diaries and similar articles, exercise books, blotting pads, binders, folders, file covers, manifold business forms, interleaved carbon sets and other articles of stationery, of paper or paperboard; albums for samples or for collections and book covers, of paper and paperboard
4821	Paper or paperboard labels of all kinds, whether or not printed
5602	Felt, whether or not impregnated, coated, covered or laminated, n.e.s.
5603	Nonwovens, whether or not impregnated, coated, covered or laminated, n.e.s.
5607	Twine, cordage, ropes and cables, whether or not plaited or braided and whether or not impregnated, coated, covered or sheathed with rubber or plastics, excluding CN 5607 41 (binder or baler twine, of polyethylene or polypropylene)
5608	Knotted netting of twine, cordage or rope, by the piece or metre; made-up fishing nets and other made-up nets, of textile materials (excl. hairnets, nets for sporting purposes, incl. landing nets, butterfly nets and the like)
5902	Tyre cord fabric of high-tenacity yarn of nylon or other polyamides, polyesters or viscose rayon, whether or not dipped or impregnated with rubber or plastic
5909	Textile hosepiping and similar textile tubing, whether or not impregnated or coated, with or without lining, armour or accessories of other materials
5911 90	Textile products and articles, for technical purposes, specified in Note 7 to chapter 59, n.e.s.
6302	Bedlinen, table linen, toilet linen and kitchen linen of all types of textile materials (excl. floorcloths, polishing cloths, dishcloths and dusters)
6305	Sacks and bags, of a kind used for the packing of goods, of all types of textile materials
6306	Tarpaulins, awnings and sunblinds; tents; sails for boats, sailboards or landcraft; camping goods of all types of textile materials (excl. flat protective coverings of light woven fabrics; umbrella and play tents; rucksacks, napsacks and similar containers; sleeping bags, mattresses and pillows, incl. their fillings)
6307	Made-up articles of textile materials, incl. dress patterns, n.e.s.
6310	Used or new rags, scrap twine, cordage, rope and cables and worn-out articles thereof, of textile materials
6406	Parts of footwear, incl. uppers whether or not attached to soles other than outer soles; removable in-soles, heel cushions and similar articles; gaiters, leggings and similar articles, and parts thereof (excl. articles of asbestos)
6505	Hats and other headgear, knitted or crocheted, or made up from lace, felt or other textile fabric, in the piece (but not in strips), whether or not lined or trimmed; hairnets of any material, whether or not lined or trimmed
6506 10	Headgear, whether or not lined or trimmed, n.e.s.
6804 21	Millstones, grindstones, grinding wheels and the like, without frameworks, for sharpening, polishing, trueing or cutting, of agglomerated synthetic or natural diamond (excl. hand sharpening or polishing stones, and grinding wheels etc. specifically for dental drill engines)
6804 22	Millstones, grindstones, grinding wheels and the like, without frameworks, for sharpening, polishing, trueing or cutting, of agglomerated abrasives or ceramics (excl. of agglomerated synthetic or natural diamond, hand sharpening or polishing stones, perfumed pumice stones, and grinding wheels etc. specifically for dental drill engines)
6805	Natural or artificial abrasive powder or grain, on a base of textile material, paper, paperboard or other materials, whether or not cut to shape or sewn or otherwise made up
6903	Retorts, crucibles, mufflers, nozzles, plugs, supports, cupels, tubes, pipes, sheaths, rods, slide gates and other refractory ceramic goods (excl. those of siliceous fossil meals or of similar siliceous earths, and refractory bricks, blocks, tiles and similar refractory ceramic constructional goods)

7019	Glass fibres, incl. glass wool, and articles thereof (excl. mineral wools and articles thereof, optical fibres, fibre bundles or cable, electrical insulators or parts thereof, brushes of glass fibres, dolls' wigs)
7312	Stranded wire, ropes, cables, plaited bands, slings and the like, of iron or steel (excl. electrically insulated products and twisted fencing wire and barbed wire)
7315	Chain and parts thereof, of iron or steel (excl. watch chains, necklace chains and the like, cutting and saw chain, skid chain, scraper chain for conveyors, toothed chain for textile machinery and the like, safety devices with chains for securing doors, measuring chains)
7317	Nails, tacks, drawing pins, corrugated nails, staples and similar articles of iron or steel, whether or not with heads of other material (excl. such articles with heads of copper and staples in strips)
7318 15	Threaded screws and bolts, of iron or steel, whether or not with their nuts and washers (excl. coach screws and other wood screws, screw hooks and screw rings, self-tapping screws, lag screws, stoppers, plugs and the like, threaded)
7318 19	Threaded articles, of iron or steel, n.e.s.
7318 22	Washers of iron or steel (excl. spring washers and other lock washers)
7318 29	Non-threaded articles, of iron or steel
7326	Articles of iron or steel, n.e.s. (excl. cast articles)
7403	Copper, refined, and copper alloys, unwrought (excl. copper alloys of heading 7405)
7415 33	Screws, bolts, nuts and similar articles, threaded, of copper (other than screw hooks, ring- and eyebolts, lag screws, plugs, bungs and the like, with screw thread)
8202 31	Circular saw blades, incl. slitting or slotting saw blades, of base metal, with working parts of steel
8202 91	Straight saw blades, of base metal, for working metal
8203	Files, rasps, pliers, incl. cutting pliers, pincers and tweezers for non-medical use, metal-cutting shears, pipe-cutters, bolt croppers, perforating punches and similar hand tools, of base metal
8204	Hand-operated spanners and wrenches, incl. torque meter wrenches (excl. tap wrenches), of base metal; interchangeable spanner sockets, with or without handles, of base metal
8205	Hand tools, incl. glaziers' diamonds, of base metal, n.e.s.; blowlamps and the like; vices, clamps and the like (other than accessories for and parts of machine-tools or water-jet cutting machines); anvils; portable forges; hand-operated or pedal-operated grinding wheels with frameworks
8211	Knives with cutting blades, serrated or not, incl. pruning knives, and blades therefor, of base metal (excl. straw knives, machetes, knives and cutting blades for machines or mechanical appliances, fish knives, butter knives, razors and razor blades and knives of heading 8214)
8305	Fittings for loose-leaf binders or files, letter clips, letter corners, paper clips, indexing tags and similar office articles, of base metal (excl. drawing pins and clasps for books or registers); staples in strips, e.g. for use in offices, upholstery and packaging, of base metal
8308	Clasps, frames with clasps, buckles, buckle-clasps, hooks, eyes, eyelets and the like, of base metal, of a kind used for clothing, footwear, awnings, handbags, travel goods or other made-up articles, tubular or bifurcated rivets, of base metal; beads and spangles of base metal
8311	Wire, rods, tubes, plates, electrodes and similar products, of base metal or of metal carbides, coated or cored with flux material, of a kind used for soldering, brazing, welding or deposition of metal or of metal carbides; wire and rods, of agglomerated base metal powder, used for metal spraying
8414	Air or vacuum pumps, air or other gas compressors and fans; ventilating or recycling hoods incorporating a fan, whether or not fitted with filters; gas-tight biological safety cabinets, whether or not fitted with filters, excluding 8414 10 (vacuum pumps), 8418 10 81 (cryogenic pumps in the LNG-process) and 8414 90 (Parts)
8418	Refrigerators, freezers and other refrigerating or freezing equipment, electric or other; heat pumps other than air conditioning machines of heading 84.15 and excluding 8418 69 00 (Process units for gas cooling in the LNG-process), excluding CN 8418 99

8422	Dish washing machines; machinery for cleaning or drying bottles or other containers; machinery for filling, closing, sealing or labelling bottles, cans, boxes, bags or other containers; machinery for capsuling bottles, jars, tubes and similar containers; other packing or wrapping machinery (including heat-shrink wrapping machinery); machinery for aerating beverages, excluding CN 8422 20 and 8422 30
8438	Machinery, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter, for the industrial preparation or manufacture of food or drink (other than machinery for the extraction or preparation of animal or fixed vegetable fats or oils); parts thereof
8443 11	Offset printing machinery, reel-fed
8443 14	Letterpress printing machinery, reel fed, excluding flexographic printing
8443 99	Other.
8516 10	Electric instantaneous or storage water heaters and immersion heaters
8516 40	Electric smoothing irons
8516 79	Electric instantaneous or storage water heaters and immersion heaters
8907	Rafts, tanks, coffer-dams, landing stages, buoys, beacons and other floating structures (excl. vessels of heading 8901 to 8906 and floating structures for breaking up)
9001 90	Lenses, prisms, mirrors and other optical elements, of any material, unmounted (excl. such elements of glass not optically worked, contact lenses and spectacle lenses)
9002 90	Lenses, prisms, mirrors and other optical elements, mounted, of any material, being parts of or fittings for instruments or apparatus (excl. objective lenses for cameras, projectors or photographic enlargers or reducers, such elements of glass not optically worked, and filters)
9017	Drawing, marking-out or mathematical calculating instruments, e.g. drafting machines, pantographs, protractors, drawing sets, slide rules, disc calculators; instruments for measuring length, for use in the hand, e.g. measuring rods and tapes, micrometres, callipers and other gauges, not elsewhere specified in chapter 90
9025	Hydrometers and similar floating instruments, thermometers, pyrometers, barometers, hygrometers and psychrometers, recording or not, and any combination of these instruments, excluding CN 9025 90 (Parts and accessories for hydrometers, areometers and similar floating instruments, thermometers, pyrometers, barometers, hygrometers and psychrometers, n.e.s.)
9405	Luminaires and lighting fittings, incl. searchlights and spotlights, and parts thereof, n.e.s.; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like having a permanently fixed light source, and parts thereof, n.e.s.
9603	Brooms, brushes, incl. brushes constituting parts of machines, appliances or vehicles, hand-operated mechanical floor sweepers, not motorised, mops and leather dusters; prepared knots and tufts for broom or brush making; paint pads and rollers; squeegees of rubber or similar flexible materials
9608 20	Felt-tipped and other porous-tipped pens and markers
9608 40	Propelling or sliding pencils

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## Listi við marglætisvörum, sum eru loyvdar at útflyta til Russlands samsvarandi treytunum í § 13 a

## 1) Perfumes, toilet waters and cosmetics, including beauty and make-up products

ex	3303	Perfumes and toilet waters
ex	3304 00 00	Beauty or make-up preparations and preparations for the care of the skin (other than medicaments), including sunscreen or suntan preparations; manicure or pedicure preparations
ex	3305 00 00	Preparations for use on the hair
ex	3307 00 00	Pre-shave, shaving or aftershave preparations, personal deodorants, bath preparations, depilatories and other perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations, not elsewhere specified or included; prepared room deodorisers, whether or not perfumed or having disinfectant properties

## 2) Articles and equipment for sports, including skiing, golf, diving and water sports

ex	4015 19 00	Other
ex	4015 90 00	Other
ex	9020 00 00	Other breathing appliances and gas masks, excluding protective masks having neither mechanical parts nor replaceable filters

## 3) Leather, saddlery and travel goods, handbags and similar articles

ex	4202 00 00	Trunks, suitcases, vanity cases, executive-cases, briefcases, school satchels, spectacle cases, binocular cases, camera cases, musical instrument cases, gun cases, holsters and similar containers; travelling-bags, insulated food or beverage bags, toilet bags, rucksacks, handbags, shopping-bags, wallets, purses, map-cases, cigarette-cases, tobacco-pouches, tool bags, sports bags, bottle-cases, jewellery boxes, powder-boxes, cutlery cases and similar containers, of leather or of composition leather, of sheeting of plastics, of textile materials, of vulcanised fibre or of paperboard, or wholly or mainly covered with such materials or with paper.
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## 4) Coats, or other garments, clothing accessories and shoes (regardless of their material)

ex	4203 00 00	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, of leather or composition leather
ex	6101 00 00	Men's or boys' overcoats, car coats, capes, cloaks, anoraks (including ski jackets), windcheaters, wind-jackets and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, other than those of heading 6103
ex	6102 00 00	Women's or girls' overcoats, car coats, capes, cloaks, anoraks (including ski jackets), windcheaters, wind-jackets and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, other than those of heading 6104
ex	6103 00 00	Men's or boys' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear), knitted or crocheted
ex	6107 00 00	Men's or boys' underpants, briefs, nightshirts, pyjamas, bathrobes, dressing gowns and similar articles, knitted or crocheted
ex	6109 00 00	T-shirts, singlets and other vests, knitted or crocheted
ex	6111 00 00	Babies' garments and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted
ex	6115 00 00	Pantyhose, tights, stockings, socks and other hosiery, incl. graduated compression hosiery (e.g., stockings for varicose veins) and footwear without applied soles, knitted or crocheted

ex	6116 00 00	Gloves, mittens and mitts, knitted or crocheted
ex	6201 00 00	Men's or boys' overcoats, car coats, capes, cloaks, anoraks (incl. ski jackets), windcheaters, wind-jackets and similar articles, other than those of heading 6203
ex	6203 00 00	Men's or boys' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear)
ex	6204 00 00	Women's or girls' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, dresses, skirts, divided skirts, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear)
ex	6211 33 00	Of man-made fibres
ex	6211 39 00	Of other textile materials
ex	6401 00 00	Waterproof footwear with outer soles and uppers of rubber or of plastics, the uppers of which are neither fixed to the sole nor assembled by stitching, riveting, nailing, screwing, plugging or similar processes
ex	6402 91 00	Covering the ankle
ex	6403 40 00	Other footwear, incorporating a protective metal toecap
ex	6405 00 00	Other footwear
ex	6505 00 10	Of fur felt or of felt of wool and fur, made from the hat bodies, hoods or plateaux of heading 6501 00 00
ex	6505 00 30	Peaked caps
ex	6505 00 90	Other

#### 5) Carpets, rugs and tapestries, hand-made or not

ex	5702 91 00	Carpets and other textile floor coverings, woven, not tufted or flopped, whether or not made up, incl. Kelem, Schumacks, Karamanie and similar hand-woven rugs of wool or fine animal hair
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#### 6) Electronic items for domestic use of a value not exceeding EUR 750 each

ex	8414 51	Table, floor, wall, window, ceiling or roof fans, with a self-contained electric motor of an output not exceeding 125 W
ex	8414 59 00	Other
ex	8414 60 00	Hoods having a maximum horizontal side not exceeding 120 cm
ex	8418 10 00	Combined refrigerator-freezers, fitted with separate external door
ex	8418 21 00	Compression-type
ex	8418 29 00	Other
ex	8418 30 00	Freezers of the chest type, not exceeding 800 litres capacity
ex	8418 40 00	Freezers of the upright type, not exceeding 900 litres capacity
ex	8422 11 00	Of the household type
ex	8443 12 00	Offset printing machinery, sheet fed, office type (using sheets with one side not exceeding 22 cm and the other side not exceeding 36 cm in the unfolded state)
ex	8443 31 00	Machines which perform two or more of the functions of printing, copying or facsimile transmission, capable of connecting to an automatic data-processing machine or to a network
ex	8443 32 00	Other, capable of connecting to an automatic data-processing machine or to a network
ex	8443 39 00	Other
ex	8508 11 00	Of a power not exceeding 1 500 W and having a dust bag or other receptacle capacity not exceeding 20 l

- 7) **Vehicles, for the transport of persons on earth, air or sea of a value not exceeding EUR 50 000 each, teleferics, chairlifts, ski-draglines, traction mechanisms for funiculars, motorbikes of a value not exceeding EUR 5 000 each, as well as their accessories and spare parts**

ex	8708 00 00	Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles of headings 8701 to 8705
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Skjal 6

“Skjal 6 A

**Listi við skipum, sum eru fevnd av § 15a, samsvarandi fylgiskjali XLII til fyriskipan Ráðsins nr. 833/2014**

Samanskrivaði listin hjá Evropasamveldinum við skipum, sum eru fevnd av § 15 a, samsvarandi fylgiskjali XLII til fyriskipan Ráðsins nr. 833/2014, sæst á heimasíðuni hjá Uttanríkis- og vinnmálaráðnum. ”

**Ritbúnaður, nevndur í § 9, stk. 2, samsvarandi fylgiskjal XXVI til fyriskipan Ráðsins nr. 765/2006**

Software for the management of enterprises, i.e. systems that digitally represent and steer all processes happening in an enterprise, including:

—

enterprise resource planning (ERP),

—

customer relationship management (CRM),

—

business intelligence (BI),

—

supply chain management (SCM),

—

enterprise data warehouse (EDW),

—

computerized maintenance management system (CMMS),

—

project management software,

—

product lifecycle management (PLM),

—

typical components of the above-mentioned suites, including software for accounting, fleet management, logistics and human resources.

Design and Manufacturing Software used in the areas of architecture, engineering, construction, manufacturing, media, education and entertainment, including:

—

building information modelling (BIM),

—

computer aided design (CAD),

—

computer-aided manufacturing (CAM),

—

engineer to order (ETO),

—

typical components of above-mentioned suites.”